release: fixes

- Fixed scheduled imports from remote CSV files so charts continue to refresh automatically in the background.
- Fixed an issue where charts using lazy rendering could remain blank when their scripts finished loading in the wrong order.
- Improved the overall security of the product. Thanks to **creeper_kirby** for responsibly reporting the issue.
- Updated dependencies.

Author: kushh23

.github/workflows/pr-announcer-docs.yml

@@ -5,6 +5,9 @@
     "."
   ],
   "themes": [],
+  "mappings": {
+    "wp-content/mu-plugins/visualizer-e2e-force-lazy-render.php": "./tests/e2e/config/force-lazy-render.php"
+  },
   "config": {
     "WP_DEBUG": true,
     "WP_DEBUG_LOG": true,

.wp-env.json

@@ -17,6 +17,22 @@ function ensurePngName( name ) {
 	return name.toLowerCase().endsWith( '.png' ) ? name : `${ name }.png`;
 }
 
+/**
+ * The image is produced inside a null-origin sandboxed iframe and returned over
+ * postMessage, so its `dataUrl` is untrusted. Only accept base64 image data URIs
+ * before it is opened, downloaded, or rendered; anything else could smuggle
+ * markup/script into the same-origin popup or an unexpected navigation target.
+ *
+ * @param {*} dataUrl Value received from the iframe.
+ * @return {boolean} Whether the value is a safe base64 image data URI.
+ */
+function isSafeImageDataUrl( dataUrl ) {
+	return (
+		typeof dataUrl === 'string' &&
+		/^data:image\/(png|jpeg|webp);base64,[a-z0-9+/]+=*$/i.test( dataUrl )
+	);
+}
+
 function downloadDataUrl( dataUrl, name ) {
 	const link = document.createElement( 'a' );
 	link.href = dataUrl;
@@ -110,11 +126,16 @@ function handleImageAction( id, name, action ) {
 		window.removeEventListener( 'message', onResult );
 
 		const dataUrl = msg.dataUrl;
-		if ( ! dataUrl ) return;
+		if ( ! isSafeImageDataUrl( dataUrl ) ) return;
 
 		if ( action === 'print' ) {
 			const win = window.open();
-			win.document.write( "<br><img src='" + dataUrl + "'/>" );
+			if ( ! win ) return;
+			// Build the node via the DOM API so the untrusted data URI is only
+			// ever an attribute value, never parsed as markup.
+			const img = win.document.createElement( 'img' );
+			img.src = dataUrl;
+			win.document.body.appendChild( img );
 			win.document.close();
 			win.onload = function () { win.print(); setTimeout( win.close, 500 ); };
 		} else {

classes/Visualizer/D3Renderer/src/index.js

@@ -0,0 +1,122 @@
+/**
+ * Security regression: D3 renderer "print"/"image" action must not let a
+ * compromised chart iframe break out of its sandbox.
+ *
+ * D3 chart code runs inside <iframe sandbox="allow-scripts"> (null origin) and
+ * returns the exported image to the parent over postMessage. That `dataUrl` is
+ * therefore attacker-controlled. Previously index.js wrote it unescaped into a
+ * freshly opened, SAME-ORIGIN popup:
+ *
+ *     const win = window.open();                               // about:blank => site origin
+ *     win.document.write( "<br><img src='" + dataUrl + "'/>" );
+ *
+ * so a hostile "dataUrl" could inject active markup (e.g. <img onerror=...>) into
+ * the site's own origin. A Contributor (edit_post on their own draft chart, no
+ * unfiltered_html) could store such chart code -> stored-XSS privilege escalation.
+ *
+ * The handler now validates the value with isSafeImageDataUrl() and builds the
+ * <img> via the DOM API instead of string concatenation. This test drives the
+ * REAL index.js module and asserts the breakout is blocked while a legitimate
+ * export still renders.
+ *
+ * @jest-environment jsdom
+ */
+
+/* eslint-disable no-undef */
+
+const path = require( 'path' );
+
+describe( 'D3 renderer print/image action', () => {
+	let actionHandlers;
+	let openSpy;
+
+	beforeEach( () => {
+		jest.resetModules();
+		actionHandlers = {};
+
+		// Minimal jQuery shim: index.js only uses `$( 'body' ).on( event, fn )`.
+		global.jQuery = () => ( {
+			on( event, fn ) {
+				( actionHandlers[ event ] = actionHandlers[ event ] || [] ).push( fn );
+				return this;
+			},
+		} );
+
+		// window.open() returns a popup backed by a real (detached) document so
+		// createElement/appendChild/write behave exactly as in a browser.
+		openSpy = jest.spyOn( window, 'open' ).mockImplementation( () => {
+			const popupDoc = document.implementation.createHTMLDocument( '' );
+			return { document: popupDoc, print() {}, close() {} };
+		} );
+
+		// Load the real module (registers the body event handlers via the shim).
+		require( path.resolve( __dirname, '../src/index.js' ) );
+	} );
+
+	afterEach( () => {
+		openSpy.mockRestore();
+	} );
+
+	/**
+	 * Stub the container/iframe lookups the code performs, with a MALICIOUS
+	 * iframe contentWindow that answers 'export-image' with an attacker-chosen
+	 * dataUrl. Real <iframe> nodes are avoided so jsdom creates no browsing
+	 * contexts; we only satisfy getElementById()/querySelector().
+	 *
+	 * @param {string} id      Container id.
+	 * @param {string} dataUrl The value the compromised iframe returns.
+	 */
+	function setupChart( id, dataUrl ) {
+		const evilContentWindow = {
+			postMessage( msg ) {
+				if ( ! msg || msg.type !== 'export-image' ) return;
+				const reply = new window.MessageEvent( 'message', {
+					data: { type: 'export-image-result', dataUrl },
+				} );
+				Object.defineProperty( reply, 'source', { value: evilContentWindow } );
+				window.dispatchEvent( reply );
+			},
+		};
+
+		const fakeIframe = { contentWindow: evilContentWindow };
+		const fakeContainer = {
+			querySelector: ( sel ) => ( sel.indexOf( 'iframe' ) !== -1 ? fakeIframe : null ),
+		};
+
+		jest.spyOn( document, 'getElementById' ).mockImplementation( ( wanted ) =>
+			wanted === id ? fakeContainer : null
+		);
+	}
+
+	function firePrint( id ) {
+		actionHandlers[ 'visualizer:action:specificchart' ].forEach( ( fn ) =>
+			fn( {}, { action: 'print', id, dataObj: { name: 'chart' } } )
+		);
+	}
+
+	it( 'blocks a hostile dataUrl: no popup, no injected markup', () => {
+		const payload = "x'/><img src=z onerror=\"window.__xss_fired=true\">";
+		setupChart( 'viz-evil', payload );
+
+		firePrint( 'viz-evil' );
+
+		// The value fails validation before window.open(), so no popup is created.
+		expect( openSpy ).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+		expect( window.__xss_fired ).toBeUndefined();
+	} );
+
+	it( 'renders a legitimate image export as a single safe <img>', () => {
+		setupChart( 'viz-safe', '' );
+
+		firePrint( 'viz-safe' );
+
+		expect( openSpy ).toHaveBeenCalledTimes( 1 );
+		const popupDoc = openSpy.mock.results[ 0 ].value.document;
+		const imgs = popupDoc.querySelectorAll( 'img' );
+		expect( imgs.length ).toBe( 1 );
+		expect( imgs[ 0 ].getAttribute( 'src' ) ).toBe(
+			''
+		);
+		expect( popupDoc.querySelector( 'img[onerror]' ) ).toBeNull();
+	} );
+} );

classes/Visualizer/D3Renderer/tests/print-action-xss.test.js

@@ -307,7 +307,7 @@ public function get_visualizer_data( $post ) {
 		$data['visualizer-settings'] = apply_filters( Visualizer_Plugin::FILTER_GET_CHART_SETTINGS, $data['visualizer-settings'], $post_id, $data['visualizer-chart-type'] );
 
 		// handle data filter hooks
-		$data['visualizer-data'] = apply_filters( Visualizer_Plugin::FILTER_GET_CHART_DATA, unserialize( html_entity_decode( get_the_content( $post_id ) ) ), $post_id, $data['visualizer-chart-type'] );
+		$data['visualizer-data'] = apply_filters( Visualizer_Plugin::FILTER_GET_CHART_DATA, Visualizer_Module::decode_content( html_entity_decode( get_post_field( 'post_content', $post_id, 'raw' ) ) ), $post_id, $data['visualizer-chart-type'] );
 
 		// we are going to format only for tabular charts, because we are not sure of the effect on others.
 		// this is to solve the case where boolean data shows up as all-ticks on gutenberg.

classes/Visualizer/Gutenberg/Block.php

@@ -722,6 +722,27 @@ protected static function numberOfCharts() {
 		return $q->found_posts;
 	}
 
+	/**
+	 * Checks whether the current user may edit a specific chart.
+	 *
+	 * @param int $chart_id Chart ID.
+	 * @return bool
+	 */
+	public static function can_edit_chart( $chart_id ) {
+		$chart_id = absint( $chart_id );
+		if ( ! $chart_id ) {
+			return false;
+		}
+
+		$chart = get_post( $chart_id );
+		return $chart
+			&& Visualizer_Plugin::CPT_VISUALIZER === $chart->post_type
+			&& (
+				current_user_can( 'edit_post', $chart_id )
+				|| ( (int) $chart->post_author === get_current_user_id() && current_user_can( 'edit_posts' ) )
+			);
+	}
+
 	/**
 	 * Checks if the PRO version is active.
 	 *
@@ -778,6 +799,85 @@ final public static function get_features_for_license( $plan ) {
 		}
 	}
 
+	/**
+	 * Safely unserialize chart/source content, blocking PHP object injection.
+	 *
+	 * Single guarded chokepoint shared by chart/source content sinks so the
+	 * allowed_classes guard cannot be dropped from one call site independently.
+	 *
+	 * @param mixed $content The serialized content (only strings are decoded).
+	 * @return mixed The decoded value (array for valid chart data), or false.
+	 */
+	public static function decode_content( $content ) {
+		if ( ! is_string( $content ) ) {
+			return false;
+		}
+		$value = unserialize( trim( $content ), array( 'allowed_classes' => false ) );
+		if ( self::contains_references( $value ) ) {
+			return false;
+		}
+		return self::strip_incomplete_objects( $value );
+	}
+
+	/**
+	 * Check decoded arrays for references before recursively processing them.
+	 *
+	 * Cyclic serialized arrays necessarily contain a reference. Rejecting all
+	 * references also prevents shared references from becoming cycles later,
+	 * so strip_incomplete_objects() cannot recurse without terminating.
+	 *
+	 * @param mixed $value The decoded value.
+	 * @return bool Whether the value contains an array reference.
+	 */
+	private static function contains_references( $value ) {
+		if ( ! is_array( $value ) ) {
+			return false;
+		}
+		foreach ( array_keys( $value ) as $key ) {
+			if ( null !== ReflectionReference::fromArrayElement( $value, $key ) ) {
+				return true;
+			}
+			if ( is_array( $value[ $key ] ) && self::contains_references( $value[ $key ] ) ) {
+				return true;
+			}
+		}
+		return false;
+	}
+
+	/**
+	 * Remove the __PHP_Incomplete_Class stubs the allowed_classes guard leaves
+	 * behind; they crash map_deep() when the decoded value is written back to
+	 * post meta. Legitimate chart content is nested arrays/scalars only.
+	 *
+	 * @param mixed $value The decoded value.
+	 * @return mixed The value without object stubs; false for a top-level stub.
+	 */
+	private static function strip_incomplete_objects( $value ) {
+		if ( $value instanceof __PHP_Incomplete_Class ) {
+			return false;
+		}
+		if ( is_array( $value ) ) {
+			foreach ( $value as $key => $item ) {
+				if ( $item instanceof __PHP_Incomplete_Class ) {
+					unset( $value[ $key ] );
+				} elseif ( is_array( $item ) ) {
+					$value[ $key ] = self::strip_incomplete_objects( $item );
+				}
+			}
+		}
+		return $value;
+	}
+
+	/**
+	 * Object-injection-safe drop-in for maybe_unserialize().
+	 *
+	 * @param mixed $value Raw meta/content value.
+	 * @return mixed The decoded value for serialized input, the value unchanged otherwise.
+	 */
+	public static function maybe_decode_content( $value ) {
+		return is_serialized( $value ) ? self::decode_content( $value ) : $value;
+	}
+
 	/**
 	 * Gets the chart content after common manipulations.
 	 */
@@ -793,7 +893,7 @@ function ( $matches ) {
 			},
 			$post_content
 		);
-		$data = unserialize( $post_content );
+		$data = self::decode_content( $post_content );
 		$altered = array();
 		if ( ! empty( $data ) ) {
 			foreach ( $data as $index => $array ) {