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214 lines (181 loc) · 7.3 KB
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// Copyright 2025 The ThunderID Authors
// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
/* eslint-disable @typescript-eslint/typedef, sort-keys */
import {describe, it, expect} from 'vitest';
import {
createSessionToken,
verifySessionToken,
createTempSessionToken,
verifyTempSessionToken,
} from '../../src/runtime/server/utils/session';
const TEST_SECRET = 'test-secret-at-least-32-characters-long!!';
describe('createSessionToken / verifySessionToken', () => {
it('round-trips a minimal session payload', async () => {
const token = await createSessionToken(
{
accessToken: 'at_test',
userId: 'user-123',
sessionId: 'sess-abc',
scopes: 'openid profile',
},
TEST_SECRET,
);
expect(typeof token).toBe('string');
expect(token.split('.')).toHaveLength(3); // valid JWT
const payload = await verifySessionToken(token, TEST_SECRET);
expect(payload.sub).toBe('user-123');
expect(payload.sessionId).toBe('sess-abc');
expect(payload.accessToken).toBe('at_test');
expect(payload.scopes).toBe('openid profile');
});
it('includes organizationId when provided', async () => {
const token = await createSessionToken(
{
accessToken: 'at_org',
userId: 'user-456',
sessionId: 'sess-org',
scopes: 'openid',
organizationId: 'org-789',
},
TEST_SECRET,
);
const payload = await verifySessionToken(token, TEST_SECRET);
expect(payload.organizationId).toBe('org-789');
});
it('rejects a token signed with a different secret', async () => {
const token = await createSessionToken(
{accessToken: 'at', userId: 'u', sessionId: 's', scopes: 'openid'},
TEST_SECRET,
);
await expect(verifySessionToken(token, 'a-completely-different-secret-value!!')).rejects.toThrow();
});
it('rejects a tampered token', async () => {
const token = await createSessionToken(
{accessToken: 'at', userId: 'u', sessionId: 's', scopes: 'openid'},
TEST_SECRET,
);
// Flip the first character of the signature — the first char encodes 6 full
// data bits, so any change reliably alters the decoded value (unlike the last
// char, which only carries 4 data bits and can be a no-op when those bits collide).
const parts = token.split('.');
parts[2] = (parts[2][0] === 'a' ? 'b' : 'a') + parts[2].slice(1);
const tampered = parts.join('.');
await expect(verifySessionToken(tampered, TEST_SECRET)).rejects.toThrow();
});
it('uses the default expiry of ~3600 seconds', async () => {
const before = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);
const token = await createSessionToken(
{accessToken: 'at', userId: 'u', sessionId: 's', scopes: 'openid'},
TEST_SECRET,
);
const after = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);
const payload = await verifySessionToken(token, TEST_SECRET);
// exp should be within [before+3600, after+3600] with a small tolerance
expect(payload.exp).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(before + 3590);
expect(payload.exp).toBeLessThanOrEqual(after + 3610);
});
it('respects a custom expirySeconds', async () => {
const before = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);
const token = await createSessionToken(
{accessToken: 'at', userId: 'u', sessionId: 's', scopes: 'openid', expirySeconds: 60},
TEST_SECRET,
);
const after = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);
const payload = await verifySessionToken(token, TEST_SECRET);
expect(payload.exp).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(before + 50);
expect(payload.exp).toBeLessThanOrEqual(after + 70);
});
});
describe('createTempSessionToken / verifyTempSessionToken', () => {
it('round-trips a temp session', async () => {
const token = await createTempSessionToken('temp-sess-1', TEST_SECRET, '/after-login');
const result = await verifyTempSessionToken(token, TEST_SECRET);
expect(result.sessionId).toBe('temp-sess-1');
expect(result.returnTo).toBe('/after-login');
});
it('works without a returnTo', async () => {
const token = await createTempSessionToken('temp-sess-2', TEST_SECRET);
const result = await verifyTempSessionToken(token, TEST_SECRET);
expect(result.sessionId).toBe('temp-sess-2');
expect(result.returnTo).toBeUndefined();
});
it('rejects a regular session token as a temp session', async () => {
const sessionToken = await createSessionToken(
{accessToken: 'at', userId: 'u', sessionId: 's', scopes: 'openid'},
TEST_SECRET,
);
await expect(verifyTempSessionToken(sessionToken, TEST_SECRET)).rejects.toThrow();
});
it('rejects a tampered temp token', async () => {
const token = await createTempSessionToken('temp-sess-3', TEST_SECRET);
const parts = token.split('.');
// Flip the first character of the signature — reliably changes the decoded
// value regardless of which character the signature happens to end with.
parts[2] = (parts[2][0] === 'a' ? 'b' : 'a') + parts[2].slice(1);
await expect(verifyTempSessionToken(parts.join('.'), TEST_SECRET)).rejects.toThrow();
});
});
describe('createSessionToken — Phase 2 fields (accessTokenExpiresAt / refreshToken)', () => {
it('round-trips accessTokenExpiresAt', async () => {
const expiresAt = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000) + 3600;
const token = await createSessionToken(
{
accessToken: 'at_p2',
userId: 'user-p2',
sessionId: 'sess-p2',
scopes: 'openid profile',
accessTokenExpiresAt: expiresAt,
},
TEST_SECRET,
);
const payload = await verifySessionToken(token, TEST_SECRET);
expect(payload.accessTokenExpiresAt).toBe(expiresAt);
expect(payload.refreshToken).toBeUndefined();
});
it('round-trips refreshToken', async () => {
const token = await createSessionToken(
{
accessToken: 'at',
userId: 'u',
sessionId: 's',
scopes: 'openid',
refreshToken: 'rt_test_value',
},
TEST_SECRET,
);
const payload = await verifySessionToken(token, TEST_SECRET);
expect(payload.refreshToken).toBe('rt_test_value');
});
it('round-trips Phase 2 fields together', async () => {
const expiresAt = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000) + 1800;
const token = await createSessionToken(
{
accessToken: 'at_full',
userId: 'user-full',
sessionId: 'sess-full',
scopes: 'openid profile email',
organizationId: 'org-123',
accessTokenExpiresAt: expiresAt,
refreshToken: 'rt_full',
},
TEST_SECRET,
);
const payload = await verifySessionToken(token, TEST_SECRET);
expect(payload.accessToken).toBe('at_full');
expect(payload.sub).toBe('user-full');
expect(payload.sessionId).toBe('sess-full');
expect(payload.organizationId).toBe('org-123');
expect(payload.accessTokenExpiresAt).toBe(expiresAt);
expect(payload.refreshToken).toBe('rt_full');
});
it('omits Phase 2 fields when not provided (backward-compat)', async () => {
// Sessions created before Phase 2 have no new fields — they must still verify.
const token = await createSessionToken(
{accessToken: 'at', userId: 'u', sessionId: 's', scopes: 'openid'},
TEST_SECRET,
);
const payload = await verifySessionToken(token, TEST_SECRET);
expect(payload.accessTokenExpiresAt).toBeUndefined();
expect(payload.refreshToken).toBeUndefined();
});
});