Wraith is pre-production. It runs on Coston2 testnet only, against Flare Confidential Compute, which Flare itself describes as "in the final stages of development and not yet a fully public production system."

Do not put real funds behind this.

These are documented in full in docs/TRUST.md and are not vulnerabilities — they are the current design's stated boundaries:

• Encrypted orders are stored on-chain as ciphertext, which is a durable exposure. Flare's own docs advise off-chain secret delivery for production.
• The demo runs with SIMULATED_TEE=true, so hardware attestation is not exercised.
• TEE signers are an owner-curated allowlist, because ITeeMachineRegistry offers no membership query.
• Wraith hides standing intent, not execution. Execution-moment MEV is explicitly out of scope.

Report privately through GitHub's private vulnerability reporting. Do not open a public issue.

Please include what an attacker gains, the steps to reproduce, and the affected component (contracts, extension, keeper, or frontend).

Findings in the money path are the most valuable: anything that lets a result be forged or replayed, lets an order settle on terms it did not authorize, or leaks an order's condition outside the enclave.