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Initial multi-factor auth functionality (#1521) #616
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| Original file line number | Diff line number | Diff line change |
|---|---|---|
| @@ -0,0 +1,204 @@ | ||
| package GADS::MFA; | ||
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| use DateTime; | ||
| use Session::Token; | ||
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| use Dancer2 appname => 'GADS'; | ||
| use Dancer2::Plugin::Auth::Extensible; | ||
| use Dancer2::Plugin::DBIC; | ||
| use Dancer2::Plugin::LogReport 'linkspace'; | ||
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| hook before => sub { | ||
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| if (my $user = logged_in_user()) | ||
| { | ||
| my $mfa_cookie = cookie 'MFATOKEN'; | ||
| # MFA needed before access? | ||
| redirect '/mfa' if request->uri !~ m!^/(mfa|logout)$! | ||
| && $user->need_mfa && !$user->recent_mfa($mfa_cookie); | ||
| # Prevent user being suddenly forced to enter MFA whilst logged in and | ||
| # using the application. This continuously refreshes the recent MFA | ||
| # cookie, as long it hasn't already expired (as per check above). This | ||
| # means that whilst logged-in the user will not need to refresh it, as | ||
| # it will always be recent. However, if they logout and remain | ||
| # logged-out after the "recent" expiry, they will be forced to | ||
| # re-enter. | ||
| _refresh_recent_mfa_cookie($mfa_cookie->value) | ||
| if $mfa_cookie; | ||
| } | ||
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| }; | ||
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| any ['get', 'post'] => '/mfa' => require_login sub { | ||
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| my $schema = schema; | ||
| my $user = logged_in_user; | ||
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| $user->need_mfa | ||
| or return redirect '/'; | ||
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| my $params = {}; | ||
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| if ($user->need_mfa_setup) | ||
| { | ||
| # Does user need to choose their MFA? | ||
| if (!$user->mfa_type_effective) | ||
| { | ||
| if (my $submitted = body_parameters->get('choose_mfa')) | ||
| { | ||
| $user->update({ mfa_type => $submitted }); | ||
| } | ||
| else { | ||
| $params->{choose_mfa} = 1; | ||
| } | ||
| } | ||
| if ($user->mfa_type_effective) | ||
| { | ||
| if ($user->mfa_type_effective eq 'otp') | ||
| { | ||
| # At this stage, we need to ensure the user can successfully | ||
| # generate an OTP token before saving it persistently to the | ||
| # database. Store in the session initially, and then once it is | ||
| # correct save to their login | ||
| my $key = session('otp_key') || $user->seed_key; | ||
| session 'otp_key' => $key; | ||
| if (my $submitted = body_parameters->get('get_key')) | ||
| { | ||
| if ($user->check_token($submitted, $key)) | ||
| { | ||
| $user->update({ | ||
| mfa_secret => $key, | ||
| }); | ||
| success __"Key has been added successfully"; | ||
| redirect '/mfa/'; | ||
| } | ||
| error __"Incorrect key submitted"; | ||
| } | ||
| $params->{qr} = $user->key_qr_base64($key); | ||
| $params->{key} = $key; | ||
| $params->{setup_mfa} = 'otp'; | ||
| } | ||
| elsif ($user->mfa_type_effective eq 'yub') | ||
| { | ||
| # For Yubikey we simply make sure we have a valid key before saving | ||
| if (my $submitted = body_parameters->get('get_key')) | ||
| { | ||
| if (my $yubi_id = $user->get_yubikey($submitted)) | ||
| { | ||
| $user->update({ | ||
| mfa_secret => $yubi_id, | ||
| }); | ||
| success __"Key has been added successfully"; | ||
| redirect '/mfa/'; | ||
| } | ||
| error __"Incorrect key submitted"; | ||
| } | ||
| $params->{setup_mfa} = 'yub'; | ||
| } | ||
| elsif ($user->mfa_type_effective eq 'sms') | ||
| { | ||
| if (body_parameters->get('mobile')) | ||
| { | ||
| # Mobile number submitted for update | ||
| if (my $mobile = body_parameters->get('mobile')) | ||
| { | ||
| if (process sub { $user->update({ mobile => $mobile }) }) | ||
| { | ||
| success __"Mobile number has been added successfully"; | ||
| redirect '/mfa/'; | ||
| } | ||
| } | ||
| else { | ||
| $params->{get_mobile} = 1; | ||
| } | ||
| } | ||
| elsif (body_parameters->get('sms-not-received')) | ||
| { | ||
| notice __"Please re-enter your mobile number and try again"; | ||
| $user->update({ mobile => undef }); | ||
| redirect '/mfa/'; | ||
| } | ||
| elsif (my $token = body_parameters->get('token')) | ||
| { | ||
| if ($user->verify_mobile($token)) | ||
| { | ||
| success __"Mobile number has been verified successfully"; | ||
| # Also use this token as a valid MFA validation and log the | ||
| # user straight in. Otherwise they would need to go through | ||
| # the same process again for the MFA token | ||
| return _mfa_token_success($user, $token); # Redirects | ||
| } | ||
| else { | ||
| report {is_fatal=>0}, ERROR => __"The token entered was not valid. Please re-enter your mobile number."; | ||
| redirect '/mfa/'; | ||
| } | ||
| } | ||
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| $params->{setup_mfa} = 'sms'; | ||
| } | ||
| else { | ||
| panic "Unexpected MFA type: ".$user->mfa_type_effective; | ||
| } | ||
| } | ||
| } | ||
| else { | ||
| # Ask user to authenticate | ||
| if (my $token = body_parameters->get('token')) | ||
| { | ||
| # Check for brute-force lockout | ||
| if ($user->mfa_failcount > 5 && $user->mfa_lastfail->add(minutes => 15) > DateTime->now) | ||
| { | ||
| error __"Multi-factor authentication is currently unavailable, please try again shortly."; | ||
| } | ||
| # Submitted token correct? | ||
| elsif ($user->check_token($token)) | ||
| { | ||
| return _mfa_token_success($user, $token); # Redirects | ||
| } | ||
| else { | ||
| # Failure, will be prompted again | ||
| report WARNING => __"Incorrect or invalid token entered"; | ||
| $user->update({ | ||
| mfa_failcount => $user->mfa_failcount + 1, | ||
| mfa_lastfail => DateTime->now, | ||
| }); | ||
| } | ||
| } | ||
| $user->send_mfa_sms | ||
| if $user->mfa_type_effective eq 'sms'; | ||
| $params->{mfa_type} = $user->mfa_type_effective; | ||
| $params->{get_code} = 1; | ||
| } | ||
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| template 'mfa', $params; | ||
| }; | ||
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| sub _mfa_token_success | ||
| { my ($user, $token) = @_; | ||
| # Has the same token already been used recently, maybe by | ||
| # an attacker, so warn user | ||
| warning "The authentication token has already been used in the last 5 minutes, possibly an attacker?" | ||
| if $user->mfa_token_previous && $user->mfa_token_previous eq $token | ||
| && $user->mfa_token_previous_used->clone->add(minutes => 5) > DateTime->now; | ||
| # Allow a token to be reused. Generate a random token and | ||
|
There was a problem hiding this comment. I don't believe we wish to make the tokens reusable. |
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| # store it in both a cookie and the database, to check for | ||
| # validity and stop it being faked | ||
| my $key = Session::Token->new(length => 32)->get; | ||
| $user->update({ | ||
| mfa_failcount => 0, | ||
| mfa_lastfail => undef, | ||
| mfa_token_previous => $token, | ||
| mfa_token_previous_type => $user->mfa_type_effective, | ||
| mfa_token_previous_used => DateTime->now, | ||
| mfa_token_previous_key => $key, | ||
| }); | ||
| _refresh_recent_mfa_cookie($key); | ||
| return redirect '/'; | ||
| } | ||
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| sub _refresh_recent_mfa_cookie | ||
| { my $key = shift; | ||
| cookie MFATOKEN => $key, expires => '7d', secure => 1, http_only => 1; | ||
|
There was a problem hiding this comment. HTTP isn't a secure means, do we need the |
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| } | ||
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| 1; | ||
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Should the
/delimiter have an\escape before it?