CodeRadar reads source code and, optionally, screenshots attached to a ticket. Source code is already in the repository the operator controls; screenshots are the sensitive surface — a bug report may show real user data, PII, or internal UI. This document states how that data is handled and how the policy is enforced in CI. It maps to failure mode G7 (privacy) and is part of the Phase 6 gate.

1. Screenshots are ephemeral. An image is processed in memory and discarded. CodeRadar never writes a screenshot to disk, never embeds one in the lineage graph, and never logs its bytes. The only place image bytes leave the process is the vision adapter's call to the model API the operator has configured (packages/vision/src/claude.ts), and only for the duration of that request.

2. The graph holds no image data. scan emits ui-lineage.graph.json from source code alone. No node or edge carries a screenshot, a crop, a base64 blob, or a data URI. The graph is safe to commit and share.

3. The corrections store holds terms only. When a human confirms that a set of terms resolves to a component, corrections.jsonl (packages/core/src/corrections.ts) records the terms and the component id — never the screenshot the terms were read from. Corrections are safe to check in.

4. No persistence of derived crops or OCR images. Vision adapters return text and structure (VisionExtraction) — the signals the matcher already understands — not pixels. Any future OCR/vision cache keys on an image hash, never the image itself.

5. Least logging. Diagnostic output names components, files, and terms. It does not include screenshot bytes or the raw model image payload.

The policy is not just documentation — it is asserted by a test that fails CI if the vision package gains a filesystem write or a code path that persists image bytes:

• packages/vision/src/policy.test.ts greps the vision source for filesystem write APIs (writeFile, writeFileSync, appendFile*, createWriteStream, fs.write, mkdir* used for output) and for image persistence patterns (writing .png/.jpg, toDataURL, embedding base64 into a written file). Any hit fails the test. The single legitimate base64 conversion — encoding an image for the model request in claude.ts — is in-memory and is asserted to flow only into the API messages.create call, not into any sink.

Run it with pnpm --filter @coderadar/vision test, or as part of pnpm -r test in CI.

If you find a path that writes, embeds, or logs screenshot data, treat it as a privacy defect (G7): open an issue and add the offending pattern to policy.test.ts so the regression is locked out.