fix: prevent command injection in nightly workflow @W-24289114@ - #2938
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Move user-controlled `inputs.only` from direct GitHub expression expansion in `run:` blocks to `env:` blocks, where the value becomes a shell variable instead of inline script text. Add input validation to reject values containing shell metacharacters.
iowillhoit
previously approved these changes
Sep 24, 2026
iowillhoit
reviewed
Sep 24, 2026
| if: ${{ inputs.only != '' }} | ||
| shell: bash | ||
| run: | | ||
| if [[ ! "$INPUT_ONLY" =~ ^[@a-zA-Z0-9/_,.~-]+$ ]]; then |
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We could remove the ~ here. No packages passed to --only will have a ~
No packages passed to --only will contain a tilde.
iowillhoit
approved these changes
Sep 24, 2026
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Summary
inputs.onlyfrom direct${{ }}expression expansion inrun:blocks toenv:blocks, so the value is treated as shell variable data — not inline script text that bash re-parses for metacharactersonlyvalues containing characters outside the npm package name charset (defense-in-depth)$ONLY_FLAGis intentionally unquoted (word-splitting required for--only <value>to become two separate CLI arguments)Vulnerability
The
workflow_dispatchinputonly(a free-form string) was interpolated directly intorun:steps via${{ inputs.only }}. GitHub expression expansion happens before the shell parses the generated script, so shell metacharacters in the input (;,|,`,$()) become live syntax. The same job exportsSVC_CLI_BOT_GITHUB_TOKENasGITHUB_TOKEN, creating a command injection → secret exfiltration path for any actor withworkflow_dispatchaccess.Work Item
@W-24289114@: [Frontier Strike][Core] salesforcecli/cli nightly workflow command injection can expose service bot token
Proof of Work
js-yamlparse — clean)${{ inputs.* }}in anyrun:block across all workflows (one other instance inpromote.ymlis a boolean input — safe)Validation
sf-releasehandles gracefully)format()specifier injection — all mitigatedTest plan
onlyvalue (e.g.@salesforce/core) — should succeedonly— should succeed (same as cron path)foo;echo pwned) — should fail at validation step